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348 
INCAPACITATING DANGEROUS REPEAT 
OFFENDERS (OR NOT): EVIDENTIARY 
RESTRICTIONS ON ARMED CAREER 
CRIMINAL ACT SENTENCING IN  
UNITED STATES v. KING 
Abstract: On March 30, 2017, in United States v. King, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a sentencing court may not rely on in-
formation in bills of particulars for the Armed Career Criminal Act’s different-
occasions inquiry. In so doing, the Sixth Circuit joined the Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits in holding that sentencing courts de-
ciding the different-occasions question may rely only on the evidentiary sources 
that the United States Supreme Court approved in Taylor v. United States in 1990 
and Shepard v. United States in 2005. In contrast, on January 2, 2014, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Evans suggest-
ed that the Taylor- and Shepard-evidentiary restrictions might not apply to the 
different-occasions inquiry. This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit decided 
correctly in King, but also that the court’s decision conflicts with congressional 
intent, and thus Congress should amend the act to resolve this conflict. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) imposes a fifteen-year man-
datory minimum sentence on any felon possessing a firearm who previously 
committed three violent felony or serious drug offenses on different occa-
sions.1 By imposing a lengthy mandatory minimum sentence, the ACCA is 
intended to help law enforcement reduce the number of dangerous habitual 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). The felon in possession of a firearm 
statute is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a crime punishable 
by a prison sentence greater than one year to ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm in interstate 
or foreign commerce. Id. § 922(g). To be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 
a defendant must not only violate § 922(g) but also have three prior violent felony or serious drug 
offenses that qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA. Id. § 924(e). The ACCA defines “serious 
drug offense” as “an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.), the Con-
trolled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. § 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46,” with a 
maximum sentence of ten or more years, or a state offense “involving manufacturing, distributing, or 
possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 
of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.§ 802)),” with a maximum sentence of ten or more years. 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). The ACCA defines “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that” either includes an element of “use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against [another person]” or “is burglary, arson, or extortion, 
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
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criminals in society.2 A sentencing court, however, may apply the ACCA only 
if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the three predicate 
offenses on different occasions.3 Congress did not enumerate in the text of the 
ACCA the types of evidence that courts may rely upon for this different-
occasions inquiry, so sentencing courts accordingly rely on prior judicial inter-
pretation for guidance.4 
In 2017, in United States v. King, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit held that a sentencing court cannot rely on a bill of particu-
lars, a list of the charges brought against the defendant, to decide the different-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (stating that “[t]he [ACCA] was intended to 
supplement the States’ law enforcement efforts against ‘career’ criminals”); H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, 
at 1 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3661 (noting that “[t]his bill is designed to in-
crease the participation of the federal law enforcement system in efforts to curb armed, habitual (ca-
reer) criminals”); James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 545–46 (2009) (explaining that 
the ACCA intends to help law enforcement incapacitate dangerous repeat offenders); Brett T. Runyon, 
Comment, ACCA Residual Clause: Strike Four? The Court’s Missed Opportunity to Create a Worka-
ble Residual Clause Violent Felony Test, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 447, 450 (2012) (noting that the AC-
CA’s purpose is to assist law enforcement efforts to stop career criminals from reoffending); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 2 (noting that “[b]oth Congress and local prosecutors around the nation 
have recognized the importance of incapacitating [the small group of] repeat offenders [who are re-
sponsible for a large number of crimes]”). This Comment uses the terms “career criminal,” “habitual 
criminal,” “repeat offender,” and “recidivist” synonymously. 
 3 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The government carries the burden of proving at sentencing by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant committed the prior offenses on different occasions. See, 
e.g., United States v. Linney, 819 F.3d 747, 751 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 4 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (not enumerating the types of evidence allowed under the different-
occasions inquiry). See generally United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267, 271–73 (6th Cir. 2017) (ex-
plaining the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Taylor v. United States and United States v. Shepard and 
that the same concerns apply to the interpretation of the different-occasions question); United States v. 
Dantzler, 771 F.3d 137, 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Taylor and Shepard applies to the different-occasions inquiry); Kirkland v. United States, 687 F.3d 
878, 883 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that Shepard’s evidentiary restrictions apply to determining whether 
a defendant committed prior offenses on different occasions); United States v. Boykin, 669 F.3d 467, 
471 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that a sentencing court deciding the different-occasions question can con-
sult evidentiary sources approved in Shepard); United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 
2010) (holding that sentencing courts determining whether a defendant committed prior offenses on 
different occasions may not rely on police reports because Shepard did not approve police reports as 
an evidentiary source); United States v. Thomas, 572 F.3d 945, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining that 
the sentencing court should have relied on two indictments and concluded that the defendant commit-
ted the prior offenses on different occasions because charging documents are one of the evidentiary 
sources that Taylor and Shepard approved); United States v. Fuller, 453 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that a sentencing court deciding the different-occasions question can rely on only Shep-
ard-approved evidentiary sources); United States v. Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that a sentencing court can rely on a presentence report (“PSR”) for the purposes of the differ-
ent-occasions question only if the PSR complies with Shepard); United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 
1146, 1157–58 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a sentencing court deciding the different-occasions 
question can rely on only evidentiary sources that comply with Shepard). 
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occasions question.5 In so doing, the Sixth Circuit joined the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits in holding that sentencing 
courts may consider only the evidentiary sources that the United States Su-
preme Court approved in Taylor v. United States in 1990 and in Shepard v. 
United States in 2005.6 The Eighth Circuit, however, suggested in 2014 in 
United States v. Evans that the Taylor- and Shepard-evidentiary restrictions do 
not apply to the different-occasions inquiry.7 
This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit decided correctly in King that 
a sentencing court may not rely on bills of particulars to determine whether a 
defendant committed prior offenses on different occasions.8 This Comment 
also examines Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Shepard, however, and argues that 
evidentiary restrictions on the different-occasions inquiry can lead to an absurd 
result in cases like King.9 Further, this Comment recommends that Congress 
amend the ACCA to enumerate the evidentiary sources allowed for the differ-
ent-occasions inquiry.10 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the history of the ACCA, 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Taylor and Shepard, and the facts and proce-
dural posture of King.11 Part II examines and discusses the circuit split regard-
ing whether the Taylor- and Shepard-evidentiary restrictions apply to the AC-
CA’s different-occasions inquiry.12 Finally, Part III argues that the Sixth Circuit 
decided correctly in King, but also that Congress should amend the ACCA to 
enumerate approved evidentiary sources and thus resolve the conflict between 
Supreme Court precedent and Congressional intent.13 
                                                                                                                           
 5 King, 853 F.3d at 275–78. A bill of particulars, also called a statement of particulars, is “[a] 
formal, detailed statement of the claims or charges brought by a plaintiff or a prosecutor, usu[ally] 
filed in response to the defendant’s request for a more specific complaint.” Bill of Particulars, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Bills of particulars are governed by Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 7(f). FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f); Bill of Particulars, supra. 
 6 King, 853 F.3d at 273–74; Dantzler, 771 F.3d at 139; Kirkland, 687 F.3d at 886, 886 n.9; 
Boykin, 669 F.3d at 472; Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1332–33; Thomas, 572 F.3d at 950; Fuller, 453 F.3d at 
279; Harris, 447 F.3d at 1305; Taylor, 413 F.3d at 1157. 
 7 See United States v. Evans, 738 F.3d 935, 936–37 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (noting that the 
court has previously rejected Sixth Amendment challenges to the type of evidence that the district 
court relies upon for the different-occasions question, and rejecting similar challenges in this case). 
 8 See infra notes 102–106 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 107–121 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–81 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 82–98 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 99–128 and accompanying text. 
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I. UNITED STATES V. KING AND THE HISTORY OF THE  
ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT 
Congress enacted the ACCA in 1984 and subsequently has amended the 
statute three times.14 Congress’ intent in enacting the ACCA was to reduce the 
number of armed career criminals in society because these dangerous repeat 
offenders are responsible for a significant portion of violent and serious of-
fenses.15 In Taylor and Shepard, the Supreme Court enumerated the sources 
that a sentencing court can rely on to determine whether a defendant’s prior 
offenses qualify as ACCA predicates.16 These approved evidentiary sources are 
statutory definitions, charging documents, jury instructions, written plea 
agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, and trial judges’ factual findings to 
which the defendant agreed.17 In King, the defendant, Errol Dontes King, pled 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402 (1988) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)); Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
§ 1402, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207–39 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924); Firearms Owners’ 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921); Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, ch. 18, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1202(a), repealed by Firearms Owners’ Protection Act § 104(b)). 
 15 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581; H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1–2; James E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, 
Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 
1952 (1991); Krystle Lamprecht, Comment, Formal, Categorical, but Incomplete: The Need for a 
New Standard in Evaluating Prior Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 98 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1407, 1411 (2008); Levine, supra note 2, at 545–46; Emily Marano, Comment, The 
Need for Sneed: A Loophole in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 52 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 175, 175 
(2011), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol52/iss6/15; Nick Poli, Comment, Three Strikes and 
You’re Out . . . Maybe: “Violent Felonies” and the Armed Career Criminal Act in United States v. 
Vann, 54 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 201, 203 (2013), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss6/16; 
Runyon, supra note 2, at 450. 
 16 United States v. Shepard, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
 17 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. A charging instrument, also called an accu-
satory instrument, is “[a]ny of three formal legal documents by which a person can be officially 
charged with a crime: an indictment, information, or presentment.” Charging Instrument, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The three types of charging instruments are indictments, infor-
mations, and presentments. Id. An indictment is “[t]he formal written accusation of a crime, made by a 
grand jury and presented to a court for prosecution against the accused person.” Indictment, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). An information is “[a] formal criminal charge made by a prosecu-
tor without a grand-jury indictment.” Information, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In-
dictments and informations are governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 7. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 7; Charging Instrument, supra. A presentment is “[a] formal written accusation returned by a 
grand jury on its own initiative, without a prosecutor’s previous indictment request.” Presentment, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Presentments, however, are obsolete in federal courts. 
Id. A colloquy is “[a]ny formal discussion, such as an oral exchange between a judge, the prosecutor, 
the defense counsel, and a criminal defendant in which the judge ascertains the defendant’s under-
standing of the proceedings and of the defendant’s rights.” Colloquy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). A plea colloquy, specifically, is “[a]n open-court dialogue between the judge and a 
criminal defendant, usu[ally] just before the defendant enters a plea, to establish that the defendant 
understands the consequences of the plea.” Plea Colloquy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
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guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, but he argued that the ACCA 
did not apply to him.18 Although King’s prior robbery convictions qualified as 
ACCA predicates, he argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that 
he committed the robberies on different occasions for the ACCA.19 
A. The History of the Armed Career Criminal Act 
Congress enacted the first version of the ACCA in 1984, codifying the 
statute at 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a).20 According to the House Report accom-
panying the ACCA, the purpose of the Act is to assist law enforcement in re-
ducing the number of armed, career criminals.21 The House Report cited sever-
al recidivism studies demonstrating that a limited number of habitual criminals 
commit a high percentage of all homicides, rapes, robberies, burglaries, and 
other violent serious offenses.22 The ACCA’s mandatory minimum fifteen-year 
sentence is directed at separating these dangerous repeat offenders from civi-
lized society for a significant period of time, thus protecting society from their 
harms.23 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, which 
amended the ACCA and recodified the statute at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).24 This 
amendment only slightly adjusted the statute’s definition of burglary, but five 
months later, Congress made more significant changes to the ACCA when it 
enacted the Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986 (“CCAA”).25 This 
amendment changed the ACCA in three ways; most notably, it changed the 
definition of predicate offense to “a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” 
                                                                                                                           
 18 King, 853 F.3d at 268–69; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 6, King, 853 F.3d 267 (No. 15-4192); 
Brief of Appellant, Errol King at 5, King, 853 F.3d 267 (No. 15-4192). 
 19 King, 853 F.3d at 268–69; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 6. 
 20 Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 § 1202(a). 
 21 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581; H.R. REP. NO. 98–1073, at 1 (stating “[t]his bill is designed to increase 
the participation of the federal law enforcement system in efforts to curb armed, habitual (career) 
criminals”); Hooper, supra note 15, at 1952; Lamprecht, supra note 15, at 1411; Levine, supra note 2, 
at 545–46; Marano, supra note 15, at 175; Poli, supra note 15, at 203; Runyon, supra note 2, at 450. 
 22 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581; H.R. REP. NO. 98–1073, at 1–2. 
 23 Hooper, supra note 15, at 1953; Levine, supra note 2, at 545; Poli, supra note 15, at 203; see 
H.R. REP. NO. 98–1073, at 2 (stating that “both Congress and local prosecutors around the nation have 
recognized the importance of incapacitating these repeat offenders,” referring to career criminals). 
Congress’s intent to separate armed career criminals from society is consistent with the incapacitation 
theory of punishment. See Dawinder Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 678–79 
(2015) (stating that the theory of incapacitation is “premised on . . . separat[ing] the offender from 
others”). There are four primary theories of punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. Id. at 677–78. Under the theory of incapacitation, offenders are separated from society, 
thus preventing future harm and protecting society. Id. at 678. 
 24 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act § 104. 
 25 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1402; Firearms Owners’ Protection Act § 104; Taylor, 495 
U.S. at 582. The Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986 (“CCAA”) is § 1402 of Section I of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1402. 
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thus capturing many more offenses than the original definition, which included 
only “robbery and burglary.”26 According to the legislative history, Congress 
believed that the original 1984 version of the ACCA was successful, and in 
1986, Congress wanted to broaden the predicate offenses so that the ACCA 
would reach even more repeat offenders.27 
In 1988, Congress amended the ACCA for a third time when it enacted 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.28 This amendment added the phrase “com-
mitted on occasions different from one another,” which is the subject of King 
and this Comment.29 Congress intended only to clarify ambiguous language, 
however, not to substantively change the statute.30 This clarification responded 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 1986 
in United States v. Petty.31 In Petty, the court counted the defendant’s convic-
tion for robbing six people at the same time as six separate convictions, and 
thus held that the defendant satisfied the ACCA’s three prior convictions re-
quirement.32 According to then-Senator Joseph Biden, by “career criminal,” 
Congress meant a person who commits at least three predicate offenses over a 
period of time, so simultaneously robbing multiple people is only one convic-
tion for the ACCA.33 The clarification reflects this understanding of a “career 
criminal.”34 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1402; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 582. The other two changes were to 
classify burglary as one of these violent felonies and the removal of the definition of “burglary.” Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1402; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 582. The legislative history suggests, however, 
that Congress may have accidentally deleted the definition of “burglary,” rather than this being a 
planned amendment. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 589–90. 
 27 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 583; 132 CONG. REC. 7697 (1986) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter); see 
Armed Career Criminal Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4639 and H.R. 4768 Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1–2 (1986) (explaining that the purpose 
of the hearing was for the House of Representatives to discuss whether to expand the ACCA’s predi-
cate offenses); Armed Career Criminal Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 2312 Before the Subcomm. on 
Criminal Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) (opening statement by 
Sen. Arlen Specter stating that “[he] think[s] the experience in the past year with the [ACCA] has 
been excellent,” and it is “time . . . to expand the [ACCA] to include other offenses, which S. 2312 
seeks to do”). 
 28 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7056. 
 29 Id. See generally King, 853 F.3d 267 (deciding whether a sentencing court is permitted to rely 
upon bills of particulars for the ACCA’s different-occasions inquiry). 
 30 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7056 (describing the amendment as a “clarification of 
predicate offense requirements for [ACAA]”); 134 CONG. REC. 32702 (1988) (remarks of Sen. Joseph 
Biden) (describing § 7056 as clarifying the ACCA). 
 31 134 CONG. REC. 32702 (remarks of Sen. Joseph Biden); see United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 
1157, 1159–60 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated 481 U.S. 1034 (1987), rev’d, 828 F.2d 2 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Hooper, supra note 15, at 1965–66; Levine, supra note 2, at 548; Marano, supra note 15, at 177. 
 32 Petty, 798 F.2d at 1159–60. 
 33 134 CONG. REC. 32702 (1988) (remarks of Sen. Joseph Biden); Hooper, supra note 15, at 
1966. 
 34 134 CONG. REC. 32702 (1988) (remarks of Sen. Joseph Biden); Hooper, supra note 15, at 
1966. 
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B. The Supreme Court Enumerates Evidentiary Sources for the  
ACCA-Predicate Question in Taylor v. United States  
and Shepard v. United States 
In Taylor and Shepard, the Supreme Court enumerated the evidentiary 
sources that a sentencing court may rely on to determine whether a prior offense 
qualifies as a violent felony or serious drug offense under the ACCA.35 Each 
case involved a defendant who was previously convicted of burglary under a 
state statute, and each Court had to decide whether the prior burglary offense 
was an ACCA predicate.36 “Burglary” is a violent felony that qualifies as a pred-
icate offense under the ACCA.37 The ACCA has not defined the term “burglary” 
since 1986, however, when the CCAA removed the definition of “burglary” 
from the statute.38 Moreover, state statutes’ definitions of “burglary” vary signif-
icantly, so there is not one common meaning of “burglary” that courts agree 
on.39 Furthermore, the ACCA’s text does not explain which, if any, of these 
many definitions of “burglary” Congress intended to qualify as a predicate of-
fense under the ACCA.40 Consequently, in Taylor, the Court had to determine 
which state burglary convictions qualify as ACCA-predicate offenses.41 
The Taylor Court concluded that Congress intended for “burglary” to 
have the generic, contemporary meaning that is consistent with how most state 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
 36 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578–79. In Taylor, the defendant, Arthur Lajuane 
Taylor, had been convicted in Missouri for one robbery, one assault, and two burglaries. Taylor 495 
U.S. at 578. At the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Taylor pled guilty 
to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. He argued 
that the ACCA did not apply, however, because his two burglary convictions did not qualify as predi-
cate offenses under the ACCA. Id. at 579. The district court rejected Taylor’s argument, held that his 
two burglary convictions were predicate offenses, and sentenced him to the mandatory fifteen-year 
minimum sentence under the ACCA. Id. Taylor appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, and the court affirmed his sentence. Id. In Shepard, the defendant, Reginald Shepard, 
had previously pled guilty and been convicted of burglary under a Massachusetts statute four times. 
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16. At the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Shepard 
pled guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. 
The district court held that it could not examine police reports to determine whether the defendant’s 
burglary convictions qualified as predicate offenses for the purposes of the ACCA. Id. at 17. Conse-
quently, the district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. Id. at 18. Shepard appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which vacated his sentence and held that the 
district court could rely on the police reports. Id. On remand, the district court again refused to sen-
tence Shepard under the ACCA. Id. On appeal, the First Circuit vacated the sentence again. Id. at 19. 
 37 Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 38 See id. § 924(e) (not enumerating the definition of “burglary”); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
§ 1402 (not enumerating the definition of “burglary”); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 582 (stating that the CCAA 
removed the definition of “burglary” from the ACCA). 
 39 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 580; United States v. Hill, 863 F.2d 1575, 1582, 1582 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(surveying several burglary statutes). 
 40 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 580. 
 41 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. 
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statutes define “burglary.”42 At a minimum, the generic, contemporary mean-
ing of “burglary” includes the following elements: “an unlawful or unprivi-
leged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to 
commit a crime.”43 Therefore, a defendant’s prior burglary conviction is an 
ACCA-predicate offense if the statute’s definition of burglary contains at least 
these elements.44 
Next, the Taylor Court addressed the evidentiary sources a sentencing 
court can rely on to determine whether a defendant’s prior burglary conviction 
satisfies the generic burglary definition.45 The Court had to choose between 
two approaches—a formal categorical approach or a factual approach.46 Under 
a formal categorical approach, a sentencing court may consider only the fact of 
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.47 A factual ap-
proach, however, allows a sentencing court to consider the facts underlying the 
prior conviction.48 
The Court concluded that a formal categorical approach is consistent with 
the ACCA’s text and legislative history as well as the Court’s concerns about 
the practicality and fairness of a factual approach.49 Under a categorical ap-
                                                                                                                           
 42 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. 
 43 Id. at 599. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 600. Prior to Taylor, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits held in favor of a formal cate-
gorical approach over a factual approach, and the Taylor Court agreed with these courts’ reasoning. 
Id.; see United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1989) (adopting a categorical approach, 
which avoids sentencing courts conducting “ad hoc mini-trials”), abrogated by Taylor, 495 U.S. 575; 
United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1006–10 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting the approach of consid-
ering only an offense’s elements and not underlying facts); United States v. Vidaure, 861 F.2d 1337, 
1340 (5th Cir. 1988) (adopting the approach that, to determine whether an offense is a violent felony 
under the ACCA, the court looks to the statutory definition of the offense); United States v. Head-
speth, 852 F.2d 753, 758–59 (4th Cir. 1988) (adopting the approach of analyzing only prior offenses’ 
statutory definitions, not specific facts), abrogated by Taylor, 495 U.S. 575. 
 47 See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2245–46 (2016) (applying the formal cate-
gorical approach and comparing the elements of the defendant’s state burglary offense to the elements 
of the generic burglary offense); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257–60 (2013) (applying 
the formal categorical approach and comparing the elements of the defendant’s state burglary offense 
to the elements of the generic burglary offense). 
 48 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600; see, e.g., Chatman, 869 F.2d at 529 (rejecting the government’s argu-
ment that the court should apply a factual approach, which would have required the court to consider 
the facts underlying the defendant’s conviction, specifically that the defendant was armed when he 
committed burglary). 
 49 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02. First, there are two sections of the ACCA where Congress chose 
language that supports that a sentencing court should consider only the fact that the defendant was 
convicted of a crime, not the particular facts underlying the crime. Id. at 600. In 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), 
Congress chose the language “a person who . . . has three previous convictions” for violent felonies or 
serious drug offenses, rather than referring to a person who has committed violent felonies or serious 
drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600. Also, in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), 
the definition of “violent felony” refers to a crime that “has as an element” the use or threat of force, 
rather than a crime that involves the use or threat of force. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i); Taylor, 495 
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proach, a sentencing court deciding whether a defendant’s prior offense is an 
ACCA-predicate can consider the prior offense’s statutory definition.50 The 
Taylor Court also left open the possibility of what is now called a modified 
categorical approach, where a sentencing court can consider charging docu-
ments and jury instructions as well.51 
In contrast to Taylor, the defendant in Shepard had pled guilty to all four 
of his prior burglary convictions, rather than being convicted by a jury at tri-
al.52 The statutory definition of the defendant’s state burglary offense was 
broader than the definition of generic burglary, and because the defendant did 
not have a jury trial, there were no jury instructions available for the sentenc-
ing court to consult.53 Thus, the Supreme Court had to determine whether Tay-
lor allows sentencing courts to consider additional evidentiary sources when 
determining whether an offense that the defendant pled guilty to qualifies as an 
ACCA predicate.54 In Shepard, the Court expanded the group of evidentiary 
sources to include written plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, and 
trial judges’ factual findings that the defendant agreed to.55 The Shepard Court 
concluded that a sentencing court cannot consider police reports or complaint 
applications.56 
Taken together, Taylor and Shepard dictate that a sentencing court decid-
ing whether a prior offense qualifies as a violent felony or serious drug convic-
tion under the ACCA may consider statutory definitions, charging documents, 
jury instructions, written plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, and 
trial judges’ factual findings to which the defendant agreed.57 
                                                                                                                           
U.S. at 600. Second, the legislative history supports a categorical approach because, despite signifi-
cant debate over predicate offenses, there is no discussion about a fact-finding process for predicate 
offenses. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601. Third, a factual approach would present practical difficulties for the 
sentencing court trying to determine the facts of the defendant’s conduct, and this approach could be 
unfair to defendants who pleaded guilty. Id. at 601–02. 
 50 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 602. 
 51 Id. at 602; King, 853 F.3d at 271 (citing Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260–62) (explaining that “[t]his 
method of consulting limited evidence to determine which of several alternative elements underlies a 
prior conviction is now known as the ‘modified categorical approach’”); see, e.g., United States v. 
Henderson, 841 F.3d 623, 625–26 (3d Cir. 2016) (applying the modified categorical approach and 
examining charging instruments to compare the elements of the defendant’s prior offenses to the ge-
neric offenses and find that the defendant’s prior convictions qualify as serious drug offenses under 
the ACCA). 
 52 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16. 
 53 Id. at 17. 
 54 Id. at 18. 
 55 Id. at 16, 26. 
 56 Id. at 16. 
 57 Id. at 26; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
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C. The Sixth Circuit Applies Taylor and Shepard to the ACCA’s  
Different-Occasions Inquiry in United States v. King 
On August 11, 2014, two Cleveland Police Department officers arrested 
Errol Dontes King for firearm-related offenses following a violent altercation 
between King and the two officers.58 On February 18, 2015, in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, King pled guilty to one 
count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm.59 
King had three prior robbery convictions that qualified as predicate offenses 
under the ACCA.60 All three of the offenses occurred on the same day—
February 18, 2002.61 The issue on appeal to the Sixth Circuit was whether 
King committed the offenses on different occasions for the purpose of the AC-
CA.62 If King committed the offenses on different occasions, then the ACCA’s 
mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence would apply to him.63 
A majority of courts have held that whether multiple previous convictions 
were committed on the same or different occasions depends on whether the 
underlying offenses arose from the same criminal episode or separate criminal 
episodes.64 Courts consider several relevant factors in determining whether 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 4–6. King was at a gas station standing next to the 
open driver’s side door of his vehicle, which was playing music loud enough to violate local noise 
ordinances. Id. at 4. Officers Aaron Reese and Vu Nguyen approached King and asked for his driver’s 
license. Id. In response, King moved toward the open door of his vehicle, and the officers feared that 
he was reaching for a weapon. Id. The officers approached King, and King fought Officer Nguyen. Id. 
at 4–5. During the fight, King twice reached into his front waistband, causing the officers to fear that 
he was reaching for a weapon. Id. Despite Officer Reese’s commands for him to stop, King continued 
to fight Officer Nguyen. Id. at 5. Officer Reese tased King for a single five-second cycle, and the 
officers were able to subdue and handcuff King. Id. When the officers searched King and his vehicle, 
they found one plastic bag of crack cocaine, one plastic bag of marijuana, and cash on King’s person, 
and a loaded semi-automatic weapon in his vehicle. Id. 
 59 King, 853 F.3d at 268–69; Brief of Appellant, Errol King, supra note 18, at 5. On September 
16, 2014, a federal grand jury indicted King with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Brief of Appellant, Errol King, supra note 18, at 5. Originally, at his ar-
raignment, King pled not guilty to this count, but, on February 18, 2015, he withdrew his plea of not 
guilty and entered a plea of guilty. Id. 
 60 King, 853 F.3d at 269; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 6. According to the Pretrial 
Services and Probation Department in its PSR, King had three convictions—(1) attempted robbery, 
(2) robbery, and (3) two counts of robbery and one count of attempted robbery—which qualified as 
predicate offenses for the purposes of the ACCA. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 6; 
Brief of Appellant, Errol King, supra note 18, at 6–7. A PSR, or presentence investigation report, is 
“[a] probation officer’s detailed account of a convicted defendant’s educational, criminal, family, and 
social background, conducted at the court’s request as an aid in passing sentence.” Presentence-
Investigation Report, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 61 King, 853 F.3d at 269; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 6–8. 
 62 King, 853 F.3d at 268. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Linney, 819 F.3d at 751 (stating that “[t]o prove that each offense was committed on a different 
occasion, the government must show that each offense arose out of a ‘separate and distinct criminal 
episode’” (quoting Boykin, 669 F.3d at 470)); Jondavid S. DeLong, Annotation, What Constitutes 
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offenses arose from the same or distinct criminal episodes.65 These factors in-
clude the location and time of each offense, whether the offenses share the 
same victims, collaboration with other criminals, mode of operation, criminal 
objective, type of offense, and firearm use.66 When considering these factors, 
various evidentiary sources may be available for the sentencing court to rely 
upon.67 
In King’s case, the evidentiary sources potentially available for consulta-
tion were: indictments, transcripts of plea colloquies, journal entries memorial-
izing guilty pleas, and bills of particulars.68 Each of the three indictments 
named the victim(s) and the date of the robbery.69 None of the three indict-
ments described when and where the offenses occurred.70 King’s plea collo-
quies might have included the times and locations of the offenses, but the tran-
scripts were no longer available.71 Three bills of particulars, however, did con-
tain the times and locations of the offenses, and they indicated that the three 
offenses occurred approximately twenty-five minutes apart from each other 
and at different locations in the same city.72 
In sentencing King, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio relied on these three bills of particulars containing the times and 
locations of the offenses.73 Through this evidence, the court determined that 
                                                                                                                           
Three Previous Convictions for Offenses Committed on Occasions Different from One Another for 
Purpose of Sentence Enhancement Under Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e), 123 
A.L.R. Fed. 397 (1995). 
 65 DeLong, supra note 64. 
 66 Id. For example, courts have held that defendants’ three prior convictions were distinct crimi-
nal episodes because they were committed on three different days, even though the convictions were 
for the same type of offense. See, e.g., United States v. Medina-Gutierrez, 980 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 67 See King, 853 F.3d at 269 (explaining information contained in several available evidentiary 
sources). 
 68 Id.; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 6–10; Brief of Appellant, Errol King, supra 
note 18, at 7. A colloquy is “[a]ny formal discussion, such as an oral exchange between a judge, the 
prosecutor, the defense counsel, and a criminal defendant in which the judge ascertains the defend-
ant’s understanding of the proceedings and of the defendant’s rights.” Colloquy, supra note 17. A plea 
colloquy, specifically, is “[a]n open-court dialogue between the judge and a criminal defendant, 
usu[ally] just before the defendant enters a plea, to establish that the defendant understands the conse-
quences of the plea.” Plea Colloquy, supra note 17. 
 69 King, 853 F.3d at 269; Brief of Appellant, Errol King, supra note 18, at 7–8. 
 70 King, 853 F.3d at 269; Brief of Appellant, Errol King, supra note 18, at 7–8. 
 71 King, 853 F.3d at 269. Even though the journal entries memorializing King’s guilty pleas were 
available, they did not include the times or locations of the offenses. Id. 
 72 Id. All three robberies took place on February 18, 2002, in Cleveland, Ohio. Id. The three bills 
of particulars stated that the first robbery happened at approximately 7:00 PM at 740 Euclid Avenue, 
the second robbery occurred at approximately 7:27 PM at 1000 Barn Court, and the third robbery took 
place at approximately 7:50 PM at East 21st and Euclid. Id. 
 73 Id. at 270. The district court adopted the government’s argument that the Taylor- and Shepard-
evidentiary restrictions did not apply to the different-occasions inquiry based on a footnote in the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Thomas in 2000 stating that the evidentiary restrictions in 
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King committed his three predicate offenses on different occasions, and thus 
the ACCA applied to him.74 The district court sentenced King under the AC-
CA, and King appealed to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that no Taylor-Shepard-
approved evidence supported that his prior offenses were committed on differ-
ent occasions.75 
King based his appeal on the fact that the bills of particulars were the only 
documents containing the times and locations of the offenses, and neither Tay-
lor nor Shepard approved a bill of particulars as an evidentiary source.76 Fur-
ther, the evidence that the court could properly consider did not contain suffi-
cient information to demonstrate that his offenses were committed on different 
occasions.77 In response, the government argued, first, that the Taylor-Shepard 
evidentiary restrictions apply only to the ACCA-predicate question.78 Second, 
the government argued that, even if the restrictions apply, the bills of particu-
lars fall within the enumerated classes of evidence.79 Alternatively, the gov-
ernment argued that, even if the sentencing court could not rely on the bills of 
particulars, the indictments and journal entries supported the finding that King 
committed his prior offenses on different occasions.80 Even though the district 
court agreed with the government’s primary argument that the evidentiary re-
strictions do not apply to the ACCA-predicate question, the Sixth Circuit re-
jected all three of the government’s arguments.81 
II. CIRCUITS IN CONFLICT OVER EVIDENTIARY SOURCES RELIED UPON TO 
ANSWER THE ACCA’S DIFFERENT-OCCASIONS QUESTION 
In United States v. King, the Sixth Circuit joined the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits in holding that the United 
States v. Taylor and Shepard v. United States evidentiary restrictions apply to 
the different-occasions inquiry.82 Consequently, in King, the Sixth Circuit held 
                                                                                                                           
Taylor did not apply to the different-occasions question. Id.; United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d 316, 
318 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000), abrogated by King, 853 F.3d 267. 
 74 King, 853 F.3d at 270. The district court examined the bills of particulars and concluded that 
the ACCA applied to King because he committed his three prior robbery offenses at three different 
times and locations. See id. at 269–70. 
 75 Id. at 268, 270. 
 76 Id. at 270. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 270, 274–75. 
 82 United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267, 273 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Dantzler, 771 F.3d 
137, 139 (2d Cir. 2014); Kirkland v. United States, 687 F.3d 878, 886, 886 n.9 (7th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Boykin, 669 F.3d 467, 472 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1326, 1332–
33 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Thomas, 572 F.3d 945, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. 
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that a sentencing court answering the different-occasions question cannot rely 
on bills of particulars, which were not approved in either Taylor or Shepard.83 
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit introduced the possibility of a circuit split when, 
in a per curiam decision in United States v. Evans, it followed an earlier deci-
sion allowing a sentencing court to rely on a presentence report (“PSR”) for 
the different-occasions inquiry.84 
A. Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits 
Hold in Favor of Only Taylor-Shepard-Approved Evidentiary Sources 
In King, the Sixth Circuit extended the Supreme Court’s Taylor-Shepard 
evidentiary restrictions on the ACCA-predicate question to the different-
occasions inquiry.85 In so doing, the Sixth Circuit joined the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, all of which had previously 
reached the same conclusion that the Taylor-Shepard evidentiary limitations 
apply to the different-occasions question.86 In King, the Sixth Circuit held that 
a sentencing court cannot rely on bills of particulars in deciding the different-
occasions question because neither Taylor nor Shepard approved them.87 
In King, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the Taylor Court’s analysis of the 
ACCA’s legislative history and the Shepard Court’s constitutional concerns re-
                                                                                                                           
Fuller, 453 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 83 King, 853 F.3d at 275. 
 84 See United States v. Evans, 738 F.3d 935, 936 (8th Cir. 2014) (following United States v. Rich-
ardson in rejecting Sixth Amendment challenges to the district court’s determination of the different-
occasions question); United States v. Richardson, 483 F. App’x 304, 305, 305 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(affirming the district court’s reliance on a PSR to determine that the defendant committed his prior 
offenses on different occasions, and footnoting that United States v. Shepard does not apply to the 
different-occasions question). 
 85 King, 853 F.3d at 273. 
 86 Id. at 273–74; see, e.g., Dantzler, 771 F.3d at 139 (holding that a sentencing court cannot rely 
on a PSR for the purposes of the different-occasions inquiry because it is not a Taylor v. United 
States-Shepard-approved evidentiary source); Kirkland, 687 F.3d at 886, 886 n.9 (holding that sen-
tencing courts deciding the different-occasions question can rely upon only evidentiary sources ap-
proved in Taylor and Shepard); Boykin, 669 F.3d at 472 (holding that the sentencing court erred when 
it relied on a PSR for the purposes of the different-occasions inquiry without first determining that the 
PSR derived from evidentiary sources approved in Shepard); Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1332–33 (holding 
that sentencing courts cannot rely on police reports to answer the different-occasions question because 
Shepard did not approve police reports as an evidentiary source); Thomas, 572 F.3d at 950 (holding 
that sentencing courts cannot rely on PSRs with potentially unreliable information in order to deter-
mine whether a defendant committed prior offenses on different occasions and that the sentencing 
court should have relied on two available indictments because indictments are one of the evidentiary 
sources that Taylor and Shepard approved); Fuller, 453 F.3d at 279 (holding that a sentencing court 
deciding the different-occasions question can rely on only Shepard-approved evidentiary sources); 
Harris, 447 F.3d at 1305 (noting that sentencing courts cannot rely on PSRs for the different-
occasions inquiry if the PSRs do not comply with Shepard); Taylor, 413 F.3d at 1157 (noting that 
sentencing courts deciding the different-occasions question must comply with Shepard). 
 87 King, 853 F.3d at 275. 
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garding the ACCA-predicate question also apply to the different-occasions ques-
tion.88 First, holding a (likely extensive) proceeding to answer the different-
occasions question would amount to a “mini-trial,” that, according to the legisla-
tive history, Congress sought to avoid.89 Second, and more importantly, the Sixth 
Circuit agreed with the Supreme Court’s concerns about the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial.90 The Shepard Court was concerned that, if a 
judge found facts beyond the mere fact of a prior conviction, basing an ACCA 
sentence enhancement on this factual finding would violate the Sixth Amend-
ment.91 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this concern in 2013 in Descamps v. 
United States and again in 2016 in Mathis v. United States.92 In King, the Sixth 
Circuit explained that this concern applies to the different-occasions question 
also—if a judge were the factfinder regarding dates, times, and locations of prior 
offenses, this would raise the same Sixth Amendment concerns.93 
B. Eighth Circuit Potentially Creates a Split by Suggesting in United  
States v. Evans That Taylor and Shepard’s Evidentiary Restrictions  
Do Not Apply to the Different-Occasions Inquiry 
In 2014, in a per curiam decision in Evans, the Eighth Circuit held that 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri did not 
violate the Sixth Amendment when it concluded that the defendant committed 
his prior offenses on different occasions.94 In so deciding, the Eighth Circuit 
followed its per curiam decision in United States v. Ramsey in 2013.95 In its 
Evans decision, the Eighth Circuit also followed its decision in United States v. 
Richardson in 2012, where it held that the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri’s reliance on a PSR for the different-occasions 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. at 272–73. 
 89 Id. at 273. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. See generally Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (explaining that a sentencing 
court deciding whether a prior offense is an ACCA predicate can look to the elements of the offense 
but not the underlying facts); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (explaining that a sen-
tencing court deciding the ACCA-predicate question must use a categorical approach, comparing the 
elements of the offense, not a factual approach). 
 93 King, 853 F.3d at 273. 
 94 Evans, 738 F.3d at 936 (rejecting the defendant’s Sixth Amendment argument that the district 
court should not have decided the ACCA different-occasions question because it is a factual determi-
nation on the basis that the court has previously rejected similar arguments). The phrase “per curiam” 
means “[b]y the court as a whole.” Per Curiam, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A per 
curiam opinion is “[a]n opinion handed down by an appellate court without identifying the individual 
judge who wrote the opinion.” Opinion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 95 Evans, 738 F.3d at 936. See generally United States v. Ramsey, 498 F. App’x 653 (8th Cir. 
2013) (per curiam) (holding that a judge’s decision that a defendant’s prior offenses were committed 
on different occasions for the purposes of the ACCA does not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial). 
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inquiry did not violate the Sixth Amendment.96 In Richardson, the Eighth Cir-
cuit footnoted that Shepard’s restrictions on evidentiary sources do not apply 
to the different-occasions question.97 In relying on Richardson, the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Evans did not clearly hold, but at least strongly suggested, that, in this 
circuit, sentencing courts are not restricted to relying only on Shepard-
approved evidentiary sources when deciding the different-occasions ques-
tion.98 
III. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE ACCA TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN SUPREME COURT CASE LAW AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
The Sixth Circuit decided correctly in United States v. King because it 
properly followed the Supreme Court’s precedent set forth in United States v. 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Evans, 738 F.3d at 936 (finding that “[m]oreover, we have rejected similar Sixth Amendment 
arguments challenging the information the district court considers when determining the specific dates 
on which the offenses occurred”); Richardson, 483 F. App’x at 305. 
 97 Richardson, 483 F. App’x at 305 n.3. In Richardson, the Eighth Circuit explained: 
Moreover, [Shepard], which Richardson cites, is not applicable here. In Shepard, the 
Supreme Court limited the materials that a district court could consider to determine 
whether a defendant who had been convicted under an overinclusive statute had been 
convicted of a predicate offense. Richardson has not alleged that the drug distribution 
and sales statutes under which he was convicted are overinclusive or that those prior 
convictions were for something other than a serious drug offense. 
Id. The defendant argued that no Shepard-approved documents contained information supporting that 
he committed his prior offenses on different occasions, and thus, when the district court concluded 
that he committed his prior offenses on different occasions, it violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 
305. Therefore, when the Eighth Circuit states in the footnote that Shepard “is not applicable here,” 
the court means that Shepard does not apply to the ACCA’s different-occasions inquiry. See id. at 305 
& n.3 (explaining that Shepard is not applicable “here,” meaning in this case, where the defendant 
argues that the court cannot sentence him under the ACCA because no Shepard-approved sources 
contain sufficient evidence to prove that he committed his prior offenses on different occasions). 
 98 See Evans, 738 F.3d at 936 (explaining that the Eighth Circuit has allowed at least one sentenc-
ing court to rely on a PSR to determine that a defendant committed prior offenses on different occa-
sions); Richardson, 483 F. App’x at 305, 305 n.3 (affirming the sentencing court’s reliance on a PSR 
to conclude that the defendant committed prior offenses on different occasions and should be sen-
tenced under the ACCA). Moreover, in Richardson, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment that the defendant committed his prior offenses on different occasions, and thus the ACCA 
applied to him. Richardson, 483 F. App’x at 303–05. The district court’s conclusion that the defendant 
committed his prior offenses on different occasions relied on the PSR. Id. at 305. Thus, in allowing 
sentencing courts to rely on PSRs for the different-occasions inquiry, the Eighth Circuit is allowing 
sentencing courts to rely on an evidentiary source not approved in either Taylor or Shepard. See Shep-
ard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (listing charging documents, plea agreements, and collo-
quy transcripts, and not listing PSRs, as the evidentiary sources allowed for the ACCA-predicate 
question); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (listing statutory definitions, charging 
papers, and jury instructions, and not listing PSRs, as the evidentiary sources sentencing courts can 
rely upon to decide whether a prior offense is an ACCA predicate); Richardson, 483 F. App’x at 305 
(affirming the sentencing court’s reliance on a PSR to conclude that the defendant committed prior 
offenses on different occasions). 
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Taylor and Shepard v. United States.99 In the context of the ACCA’s different-
occasions question in King, however, the Taylor-Shepard reasoning leads to an 
absurd result that conflicts with Congressional intent.100 To resolve this con-
flict, Congress should amend the ACCA to enumerate the evidentiary sources 
that sentencing courts can rely on for the different-occasions inquiry.101 
In King, the Sixth Circuit had to decide which evidentiary sources a sen-
tencing court can rely on for the different-occasions question because the AC-
CA’s text does not enumerate these sources.102 In Taylor and Shepard, the Su-
preme Court had to make the same decision with respect to the ACCA-
predicate question because the ACCA’s text does not enumerate these sources 
either.103 Even though the questions are different, in 2014, in United States v. 
Dantzler, the Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tay-
lor and Shepard controls a court’s interpretation of the ACCA’s different-
occasions question.104 Thus, in King, the Sixth Circuit was correct to follow 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See United States v. Dantzler, 771 F.3d 137, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that sentencing 
courts deciding the ACCA different-occasions question must follow the evidentiary restrictions in 
United States v. Taylor and Shepard v. United States). 
 100 See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 30, 35–36 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the majority’s restrictions on evidentiary sources make sentencing under the ACCA arbitrary 
and dependent on states’ “record retention policies” and “lead[] . . . not only to an absurd result, but 
also to a result that Congress plainly hoped to avoid”). 
 101 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 35–36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s eviden-
tiary restrictions on the ACCA-predicate question conflict with Congress’s intent for the ACCA to 
“incapacitat[e] repeat violent offenders” and “lead[] . . . to an absurd result . . . that Congress plainly 
hoped to avoid”); Levine, supra note 2, at 549 (arguing that Congress should amend the ACCA to 
“bring[] it into conformity with the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission”); Marano, supra note 15, at 183 (arguing that Congress should amend the ACCA to define 
“occasions different from one another” so that sentencing courts do not have to analyze prior offenses’ 
underlying facts); Poli, supra note 15, at 212 (arguing that the best solution to courts applying the 
ACCA residual clause inconsistently is for Congress to amend the ACCA to “enumerat[e] which 
crimes are violent felonies”). 
 102 See Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012) (not enumerating the types of 
evidence allowed under the different-occasions inquiry); United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267, 270–73 
(6th Cir. 2017) (analyzing Supreme Court precedent, legislative history, and constitutional concerns 
and holding that the Taylor and Shepard evidentiary restrictions apply to the ACCA’s different-
occasions inquiry). 
 103 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (not enumerating the types of evidence allowed under the ACCA-
predicate question). See generally Shepard, 544 U.S. 13 (holding that a sentencing court deciding 
whether a burglary offense is an ACCA-predicate cannot rely on police reports and is limited to “ex-
amining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea collo-
quy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented”); Taylor v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (holding that a sentencing court deciding whether a burglary of-
fense is an ACCA-predicate can rely on the statutory definition, charging paper, and jury instructions). 
 104 Dantzler, 771 F.3d at 143, 146. When deciding which evidentiary sources a sentencing court 
can rely on to answer the different-occasions question in United States v. Dantzler, the Eighth Circuit 
explained: “Although Taylor and Shepard involved the question of whether predicate offenses under 
the ACCA were ‘violent felonies,’ the reasoning underlying those decisions applies with equal force 
to the analysis of whether the offenses were committed ‘on occasions different from one another.’” Id. 
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the Taylor-Shepard reasoning.105 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit followed the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning precisely and accurately to reach its conclusion 
that the Taylor-Shepard evidentiary source restrictions apply to the different-
occasions question.106 
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion is inconsistent with congres-
sional intent underlying the ACCA.107 Congress intended for the ACCA to as-
sist law enforcement in reducing the number of armed career criminals because 
these repeat offenders are highly dangerous to society.108 Dissenting in Shep-
ard, Justice O’Connor argued that the Taylor-Shepard evidentiary restrictions 
on the ACCA-predicate question risk that some of these dangerous habitual 
criminals will not be sentenced under the ACCA.109 Rather than depending on 
whether defendants actually committed their prior defenses on different occa-
sions, sentencing will hinge on whether state courts preserve records of ap-
proved evidentiary sources.110 When a defendant who should be sentenced un-
der the ACCA does not receive the ACCA’s mandatory minimum fifteen-year 
                                                                                                                           
at 143. Again, the court noted, “we are bound by the Court’s opinions in Taylor and Shepard regard-
ing the sources that may be consulted for purposes of sentencing under the ACCA.” Id. at 146. 
 105 See King, 853 F.3d at 271–73 (determining the types of evidence allowed for the ACCA dif-
ferent-occasions question by analyzing Taylor and Shepard); Dantzler, 771 F.3d at 145–46 (holding 
that sentencing courts deciding the ACCA different-occasions question must follow the evidentiary 
restrictions in Taylor and Shepard). 
 106 See King, 853 F.3d at 271–73 (following the Taylor Court’s analysis of legislative history and 
the Shepard Court’s analysis of constitutional concerns). 
 107 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 35–36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidentiary re-
strictions on the ACCA-predicate question conflict with Congress’s intent for the ACCA to “incapaci-
tat[e] repeat violent offenders”). 
 108 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581 (stating that “[t]he [ACCA] was intended to supplement the States’ 
law enforcement efforts against ‘career’ criminals”); H.R. REP. NO. 98–1073, at 1 (1984), as reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3661 (stating that “[t]his bill is designed to increase the participation of 
the federal law enforcement system in efforts to curb armed, habitual (career) criminals”); Hooper, 
supra note 15, at 1952–53 (stating that the ACCA intends “to help state authorities more effectively 
prosecute ‘career criminals’”); Lamprecht, supra note 15, at 1411 (noting that the ACCA intends to 
reduce habitual criminals’ crimes); Levine, supra note 2, at 545–46 (explaining that the ACCA’s 
purpose is to help law enforcement incapacitate dangerous repeat offenders); Marano, supra note 15, 
at 175 (stating that the ACCA intends to “reduce crimes committed by armed, career criminals”); Poli, 
supra note 15, at 203 (noting that the ACCA’s purpose is “to protect society from violent habitual 
criminals” and “to aid law enforcement efforts against [these] criminals”); Runyon, supra note 2, at 
450 (explaining that the ACCA’s purpose is to assist law enforcement efforts to stop career criminals 
from reoffending); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98–1073, at 2 (stating that “[b]oth Congress and local pros-
ecutors around the nation have recognized the importance of incapacitating [the small group of] repeat 
offenders [who are responsible for a large number of crimes]”). 
 109 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 30, 36–37 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 110 Id. at 36–37 (“[T]he majority opinion today injects a new element of arbitrariness into the 
ACCA: A defendant’s sentence will now depend not only on the peculiarities of the statutes particular 
States use to prosecute generic burglary, but also on whether those States’ record retention policies 
happen to preserve the musty ‘written plea agreement[s]’ and recordings of ‘plea colloquy[ies]’ ancil-
lary to long-past convictions.”). 
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sentence merely because of the evidentiary restrictions, this is an absurd result 
that is inconsistent with Congress’s intent and that Congress wanted to avoid.111 
Errol Dontes King exemplifies Justice O’Connor’s concerns.112 King is 
one of the armed habitual criminals that Congress wanted to remove from so-
ciety because he embodies all of the concerns about dangerous repeat offend-
ers that Congress raised in the ACCA’s legislative history.113 First, King previ-
ously committed three robberies.114 Second, he committed these offenses on 
different occasions because the robberies happened at different times and loca-
tions.115 Also, King possessed a firearm—specifically, a semi-automatic pis-
tol.116 Moreover, he continued to pose a danger to society, not only by pos-
sessing a firearm, but also by resisting arrest and fighting police officers.117 
Despite all of this, King was not sentenced under the ACCA because the ap-
proved evidentiary sources did not contain sufficient details to conclude that he 
committed his prior offenses on different occasions.118 Had the state courts 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See id. at 30, 35–37 (arguing that the majority’s restrictions on evidentiary sources make sen-
tencing under the ACCA arbitrary and dependent on states’ “record retention policies” and “lead[] . . . 
not only to an absurd result, but also to a result that Congress plainly hoped to avoid”). 
 112 See id. (arguing that evidentiary restrictions on the ACCA-predicate question make ACCA 
sentencing arbitrary and do not fulfill the ACCA’s goal of “incapacitating repeat violent offenders”). 
See generally King, 853 F.3d 267 (holding that a sentencing court deciding the ACCA different-
occasions inquiry could not rely on bills of particulars, which were the only documents showing that 
the defendant—who was a felon in possession of a firearm—committed his three prior robbery of-
fenses on different occasions); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18 (describing the defendant’s 
three prior robbery offenses and his violent altercation with police officers, where he appeared to 
reach for a loaded semi-automatic weapon in his vehicle). 
 113 See H.R. REP. NO. 98–1073, at 2 (noting that “[b]oth Congress and local prosecutors around 
the nation have recognized the importance of incapacitating [the small group of] repeat offenders 
[who are responsible for a large number of crimes]”); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 4–
6 (describing King’s altercation with police and his possession of illicit drugs and a semi-automatic 
weapon); Levine, supra note 2, 545–46 (explaining that the ACCA’s purpose is to help law enforce-
ment incapacitate dangerous repeat offenders); Poli, supra note 15, at 203 (explaining that the AC-
CA’s purpose is “to protect society from violent habitual criminals”). 
 114 King, 853 F.3d at 269; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 6. 
 115 See King, 853 F.3d at 269 (describing the defendant’s three prior robbery offenses, which 
occurred 25 minutes apart and at different locations in Cleveland, Ohio). 
 116 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 5. At the time of his arrest, King had a loaded 
semi-automatic pistol in his vehicle. Id. 
 117 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 4–6 (describing King’s altercation with po-
lice). During King’s altercation with the two police officers, the officers feared that King was reaching 
for a weapon in his vehicle and in his waistband. Id. at 4–5. The loaded semi-automatic pistol in 
King’s vehicle was located near the driver’s seat, where King was reaching. Id. at 5. Furthermore, 
after his arrest, King told the police officers he would have a gun on him anytime they see him. Id. at 
6 (noting that King stated “if you ever see my face, I will have a gun on me. You know how it is out 
there. I know the consequence.”). 
 118 King, 853 F.3d at 269. Bills of particulars contained the times and locations of King’s offens-
es, but bills of particulars are not a Taylor-Shepard-approved evidentiary source. Id. at 269, 275, 278. 
Indictments are a Taylor-Shepard-approved evidentiary source, but King’s three indictments did not 
contain the times or locations of his offenses. Id. at 269, 271. 
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kept better records, King might have been sentenced under the ACCA.119 Thus, 
evidentiary restrictions on the ACCA’s different-occasions inquiry make sen-
tencing under the ACCA arbitrary.120 That King was not sentenced under the 
ACCA conflicts with Congress’s intent and is an absurd result.121 
The Supreme Court could grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split as 
well as the conflict between case law and legislative intent.122 The Supreme 
Court could allow sentencing courts more flexibility to rely upon different evi-
dentiary sources for the different-occasions inquiry to achieve results that 
comply with congressional intent.123 Allowing sentencing courts to rely on a 
greater variety of evidentiary sources would avoid the King result where sen-
tencing is arbitrary and depends on whether the approved evidentiary sources 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See id. at 269 (explaining that transcripts of King’s plea colloquies were no longer available 
due to Ohio state courts’ record-keeping practices). 
 120 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 36–37 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidentiary re-
strictions on the ACCA-predicate question make sentencing under the ACCA arbitrary because sen-
tencing will depend on whether state courts’ “record retention policies preserve the [approved eviden-
tiary sources, which are] ancillary to long-past convictions”). 
 121 See id. at 30, 35–36 (stating that the ACCA’s goal is to “incapacitat[e] repeat offenders,” and 
arguing that evidentiary restrictions on the ACCA-predicate question make ACCA sentencing arbi-
trary and “lead[] . . . to an absurd result . . . that Congress plainly hoped to avoid”); H.R. REP. NO. 98–
1073, at 1–2 (stating that the purpose of the ACCA is to incapacitate armed repeat offenders); Hooper, 
supra note 15, at 1952–53 (stating that the ACCA intends “to help state authorities more effectively 
prosecute ‘career criminals’”); Lamprecht, supra note 15, at 1411 (noting that the ACCA intends to 
reduce habitual criminals’ crimes); Levine, supra note 2, 545–46 (explaining that the ACCA’s pur-
pose is to help law enforcement incapacitate dangerous repeat offenders); Marano, supra note 15, at 
175 (stating that the ACCA intends to “reduce crimes committed by armed, career criminals”); Poli, 
supra note 15, at 203 (stating that the ACCA intends “to protect society from violent habitual crimi-
nals” and “to aid law enforcement efforts against [these] criminals”); Runyon, supra note 2, at 450 
(explaining that the ACCA’s purpose is to assist law enforcement efforts to stop career criminals from 
reoffending). 
 122 See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, KENNETH S. GELLER, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP, EDWARD A. HART-
NETT & DAN HIMMELFARB, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE: FOR PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 243 (10th ed. 2013) (“The Supreme Court often, but not always, will grant certi-
orari where the decision of a federal court of appeals, as to which review is sought, is in direct conflict 
with a decision of another court of appeals on the same matter of federal law or on the same matter of 
general law as to which federal courts can exercise independent judgments.”); see, e.g., Shepard, 544 
U.S. at 19 (granting certiorari to resolve conflict among Courts of Appeals regarding the application 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor to cases where the defendant pleaded guilty to the prior 
convictions that could be ACCA predicate offenses); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 579–80 (granting certiorari 
to address Courts of Appeals’ conflicting decisions regarding the definition of the term “burglary” for 
purposes of the ACCA). 
 123 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 30, 35–37 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s 
evidentiary restrictions on the ACCA-predicate question conflict with congressional intent underlying 
the ACCA and lead to an absurd result, and, instead, the Court should adopt a rule that is consistent 
with the ACCA’s goal of “incapacitating repeat violent offenders”); Marano, supra note 15, at 183 
(arguing that Congress should amend the ACCA to define “occasions different from one another” so 
that sentencing courts do not have to analyze prior offenses’ underlying facts). 
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are still available and sufficiently detailed.124 This result would allow the Court 
to maintain its Taylor and Shepard precedents regarding the ACCA-predicate 
question and create a new analysis for the different-occasions question.125 
Alternatively, Congress should amend the ACCA to enumerate which ev-
identiary sources sentencing courts can rely upon for the different-occasions 
inquiry.126 Congress could also use this opportunity to enumerate the eviden-
tiary sources for the ACCA-predicate question as well.127 Given that the goal is 
for sentencing courts to apply the ACCA consistent with Congress’s intent, 
Congress is in the best position to reshape the ACCA to function as Congress 
intends.128 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 30, 35–37 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s 
evidentiary restrictions on the ACCA-predicate question conflict with congressional intent underlying 
the ACCA and lead to an absurd result, and, instead, the Court should adopt a rule that is consistent 
with the ACCA’s goal of “incapacitating repeat violent offenders”); Marano, supra note 15, at 183 
(arguing that Congress should amend the ACCA to define “occasions different from one another” so 
that sentencing courts do not have to analyze prior offenses’ underlying facts). 
 125 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 30, 35–37 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s 
evidentiary restrictions on the ACCA-predicate question conflict with congressional intent underlying 
the ACCA and lead to an absurd result, and, instead, the Court should adopt a rule that is consistent 
with the ACCA’s goal of “incapacitating repeat violent offenders”); Marano, supra note 15, at 183 
(arguing that Congress should amend the ACCA to define “occasions different from one another” so 
that sentencing courts do not have to analyze prior offenses’ underlying facts). 
 126 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 35–36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s eviden-
tiary restrictions on the ACCA-predicate question conflict with congressional intent underlying the 
ACCA and lead to an absurd result, and, instead, the Court should adopt a rule that is consistent with 
the ACCA’s goal of “incapacitating repeat violent offenders”); Levine, supra note 2, at 549 (arguing 
that Congress should amend the ACCA to “bring[] it into conformity with the Sentencing Guidelines 
promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission”); Marano, supra note 15, at 183 (arguing that Con-
gress should amend the ACCA to define “occasions different from one another” so that sentencing 
courts do not have to analyze prior offenses’ underlying facts); Poli, supra note 15, at 212 (arguing 
that the best solution to courts applying the ACCA residual clause inconsistently is for Congress to 
amend the ACCA to “enumerat[e] which crimes are violent felonies”). 
 127 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 35–36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s eviden-
tiary restrictions on the ACCA-predicate question conflict with congressional intent underlying the 
ACCA and lead to an absurd result, and, instead, the Court should adopt a rule that is consistent with 
the ACCA’s goal of “incapacitating repeat violent offenders”); Levine, supra note 2, at 549 (arguing 
that Congress should amend the ACCA to “bring[] it into conformity with the Sentencing Guidelines 
promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission”); Marano, supra note 15, at 183 (arguing that Con-
gress should amend the ACCA to define “occasions different from one another” so that sentencing 
courts do not have to analyze prior offenses’ underlying facts); Poli, supra note 15, at 212 (arguing 
that the best solution to courts applying the ACCA residual clause inconsistently is for Congress to 
amend the ACCA to “enumerat[e] which crimes are violent felonies”). 
 128 See Levine, supra note 2, at 549 (arguing that Congress should amend the ACCA to “bring[] it 
into conformity with the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission”); 
Marano, supra note 15, at 183 (arguing that Congress should amend the ACCA to define “occasions 
different from one another” so that sentencing courts do not have to analyze prior offenses’ underlying 
facts); Poli, supra note 15, at 212 (arguing that the best solution to courts applying the ACCA residual 
clause inconsistently is for Congress to amend the ACCA to “enumerat[e] which crimes are violent 
felonies”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The ACCA imposes a lengthy fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence 
on armed career criminals in order to reduce the number of these dangerous 
offenders in society. For the ACCA to apply, the defendant must have commit-
ted three prior violent felony or serious drug offenses on different occasions. In 
King, the Sixth Circuit joined the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, Elev-
enth, and D.C. Circuits in holding that a sentencing court determining whether 
a defendant’s prior convictions were committed on different occasions can 
consider only the evidentiary sources that the Supreme Court approved in Tay-
lor and Shepard—statutory definitions, charging documents, jury instructions, 
written plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, and trial judges’ factual 
findings that the defendant agreed to. The Sixth Circuit decided correctly in 
King that a sentencing court may not rely on bills of particulars in answering 
the ACCA’s different-occasions question because neither Taylor nor Shepard 
approved them. Nevertheless, the Taylor-Shepard-evidentiary restrictions re-
sulted in King—who had three convictions for robbery and attempted rob-
bery—not being sentenced under the ACCA, which is an absurd result that 
conflicts with Congress’s intent for the ACCA to incapacitate dangerous repeat 
offenders. To resolve the conflict between Supreme Court precedent and Con-
gressional intent, Congress should amend the ACCA to enumerate which evi-
dentiary sources a sentencing court may rely upon for the different-occasions 
inquiry. 
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